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A medically invented, artificial scarcity in human organs for
transplantation has generated a kind of panic and a desperate
international search for them and for new surgical
possibilities... [Those] looking for transplant organs are so
single minded in their quest that they are sometimes willing to
I would like to thank Sheila M. Rothman and David J. Rothman for inspiring
this article and providing the background for International Community Stories
and Organ Harvesting in their article, The Organ Market, 51 THE N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Oct. 23, 2003.
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put aside questions about how the organ was obtained. In both
instances the language of 'gifts,' 'donations,' 'heroic rescues,'
and 'saving lives' masks the extent to which ethically dubious
and even illegal practices are used to obtain the desired 'scarce'
commodity, or kidney, for which foreigners are willing to pay
what to ordinary people seems a king's ransom. With
desperation built in on both sides of the equation - deathly ill
'buyers' and desperately needy 'sellers' - once seemingly
'timeless' religious beliefs in the sanctity of the body and
proscriptions against body mutilation have collapsed over night
in some parts of the third world under the weight of these new
market's demands.'
I. Introduction
Poverty oppresses the rural inhabitants of many third world
countries, and the resulting desperation sometimes leads young
men and women in these countries to sell their body parts. A
saber-like scar marks the abdomens of as many as 14 out of 40
young people in the rural towns of India and South East Asia.' It
is a symbol of either ultimate liberty or devastating exploitation.
Generally, the donor is a young man between the age of 18 and 28
who sells his kidney for $2,000-$3,000. The recipient pays
$250,000 per transplant.3  The surplus goes to international
organized crime and the doctors who make the transplants. In a
thriving underground market, "the circulation of kidneys follows
established routes of capital from South to North, from East to
West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown
bodies to white ones, and from female to male or from poor, low
status men to more affluent men."4 Despite its illegality in almost
every country, organ trafficking persists because the poverty of
1 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The End of the Body: The Global Traffic in Organs for
Transplant Surgery, Department of Anthropology University of California, Berkeley
(May 14, 1998), available at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/biotech/organswatch/pages/
cadraft.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
2 Suz Redfearn, Don't Bank Your Health on Organ Sale, THE WASH. POST, Oct.
22, 2002, at F3.
3 Eugene Tomiuc, Eastern Traffic: 'An Attack on Human Dignity' - Council of
Europe Decries Organ Trafficking, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at http:Ilwww.
rferl.org/features/2003/06/25062003162809.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
4 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Keeping An Eye On the Global Traffic In Human
Organs, 361 THE LANCET 1645, 1645 (2003).
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potential donors, endless waitlists, and better quality of organs
harvested from live donors make organ commerce an irresistible
trade.5 The coordinator of kidney transplantation at Hadassah
University Hospital in Jerusalem estimates that "60 of the 244
patients currently receiving post-transplant care purchased their
new kidney from a stranger - just short of 25% of the patients at
one of Israel's largest medical centers participating in the organ
business."6
Although organ trade is prohibited by national and
international transplant societies as well as by the World Medical
Association (WMA), their rules are rarely enforced.7 The WMA
formally espouses that, "[p]ayment for organs and tissues for
donation and transplantation should be prohibited. A financial
incentive compromises the voluntariness of the choice ....
Organs suspected to have been obtained though commercial
transaction should not be accepted for transplantation."8  The
WMA, however, neither has nor seeks the authority to discipline.
It merely provides "guidance to medical associations, physicians,
and other healthy care providers." 9 Desperate buyers and sellers
who are dealing in life and death transactions rarely follow such
guidance. As a result, there is no effective international
regulation.
The current paradigm presents the worst-case scenario. Due to
an insurmountable organ shortage, a black market exploits the
socially invisible and helpless. To continue on the current course
is to allow unacceptable exploitation. International collaboration
is required to develop a common strategy to stop the trafficking of
human organs. This Comment examines international and U.S.
attitudes towards organ harvesting with the objectives of achieving
5 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, sellers offer their organs through newspaper
advertisements where a kidney may claim $68,000 compared to the average monthly
wage of less than $200. Bosnians Forced to Sell Kidneys to Survive, Serbian Unity
Congress (Jan. 2002), available at http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2002/January-22/
7.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
6 Michael Finkel, Complications, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., May 26, 2001, at 26.
7 Sheila M. Rothman & David J. Rothman, The Organ Market, 51 THE N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Oct. 23, 2003, at 49-50.
8 World Medical Association, Statement on Human Organ & Tissue Donation and
Transplantation, at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/wma.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
9 Id. para. 1.
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a more unified front to increase organ availability and curb
exploitation in third world countries. Part II describes the various
organ harvesting policies in third world countries, using Thailand,
Singapore, and the Philippines as concrete examples of a much
broader problem. Part III discusses the history and law of organ
procurement in the United States, which construes organs as gifts
which may be freely given or withheld. This Comment questions
the sufficiency of this scheme in light of alternatives, such as a
system of presumed consent, which are arguably more effective in
increasing organ supply. For a number of reasons, presumed
consent does not have public support in the United States, which
may be rooted in notions of privacy and property law. Next, Part
IV examines the development of property and privacy law as it
pertains to the human body. Finally, Part V concludes that
presumed consent is not only a preferable system of donation
which is constitutionally sound, but it is much less intrusive than
many laws enacted in comparable situations. On an international
level, there needs to be a concerted effort to increase supply of
organs and apply rules evenhandedly. One solution may be
presumed consent, a policy in line with national and international
laws.
II. International Community Stories and Organ Harvesting
Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines serve as useful
illustrations of the varied approaches taken by third world
countries to Organ Harvesting. The following discussion of the
economic and structural conditions affecting organ harvesting in
these countries illustrates the ways in which these factors, present
in most third world countries, contribute to situations in which
organs are being harvested unethically.
A. Financial Corruption in Thailand
Even in countries where organ harvesting is illegal, incentives
to profit from organ transplantation corrupt hospital policy. For
religious or merely superstitious reasons, Thai families are averse
to organ donation and will not allow surgeons to remove organs
before cremation."0 Therefore, the waiting list for a transplant is
long. Due to a fairly wealthy population, hospitals and surgeons
10 Rothman & Rothman, supra note 7, at 49.
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are in a position to make large profits if they can find available
organs. Thailand has two health care systems. One is
characterized by dirty and overcrowded public hospitals; the other
is comprised of lavish, state of the art, private hospitals."
The private profit-seeking hospitals are centers for medical
tourism and maintain some of the best facilities in the world.
12
Some private hospitals are unwilling to help accident victims
because they are too poor to pay the bill.'3 Other private hospitals
engage in a more aggressive cost-benefit analysis: "[I]f they admit
traffic victims who then die, and if their families are willing to
donate their organs, the hospital would then have two kidneys
available for transplant into two patients able to afford the $10,000
cost of an operation that would cost about $100,000 in the United
States."14  Bangkok's Vachiraprakarn General Hospital (VGH)
adopted this policy. In spring of 2002, a transplant surgeon
persuaded the family of a comatose pregnant woman to transfer
her from a rural hospital to VGH, after promising to provide "free"
medical care. 5 The family then signed a consent form, which
authorized the removal of the woman's kidneys if she died.
16
Following her death, the family received a $2,500 payment for
"funeral expenses."' 7 The surgeon removed the woman's kidneys,
transplanted them into two patients, and charged each patient for
the full amount of the surgery and their "gifts."' 8 As calculated,
for an expenditure of $2,500, the surgeon made $25,000.19 VGH
was investigated when rumors emerged that the woman had not
been brain dead upon the removal of her organs."
The Thai Medical Council investigated the allegations and
found that VGH has consistently violated laws prohibiting the sale
11 Id. at 50.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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of organs.21  The hospital had a longstanding practice of
transplanting kidneys from living donors who are not related to the
recipient, making substantial payments to families for agreeing to
a donation, and then charging the recipients of the organs the full
costs of the payment. As a general practice, VGH bribed people in
other hospitals to transfer patients near death to VGH and paid
ambulance drivers to bring near critically injured patients to its
emergency room. 22 Though Thailand has active medical and legal
authorities, they only respond to complaints; they do not initiate
investigations. 3 Surgeons and administrators remain free to cut
their own deals in the organ market.
B. Systemic Bias in Singapore
In 1987, Singapore enacted the Human Organ Transplant Act
(HOTA), which states that the kidneys of all non-Muslim citizens
and permanent residents between twenty-one and sixty who die in
accidents shall be used for transplantation unless one has opted
out.24 To "opt out" of the system, one must sign a card that says,
"I hereby object to the removal of my kidneys upon my death for
transplantation," and then send the card to the Organ Donor
Registry. There are several noteworthy qualifications to the Act.
First, the law restricts presumed consent to road accidents so that
terminally ill patients and the elderly do not fear that their doctors
have ulterior motives, such as obtaining their kidneys.26 Second,
HOTA only applies to kidneys and not the heart, which
Singaporeans consider to be the most sacred organ. 27 And, third,
the law does not extend to Muslims, including the ethnic Malays,
who make up 15% of Singapore's population.28
A point system governs the national transplant waitlist.29 At
the top of the list, non-Muslim citizens with point tallies around
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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forty or fifty are eligible to receive an organ.3 ° Severity of illness,
age, and social criteria add points. Muslims, on the other hand,
start with a negative sixty points.3 The government explains that,
traditionally, Muslims have a track record of opting out of the
system. Therefore, Muslims are penalized because they have not
been as giving as the rest of the population and, thus, should not
receive the benefits. 32 No one else, however, in Singapore who
opts out is treated this way. Furthermore, no other country has
ever penalized people who are not organ donors.33 In Singapore,
the organ registry is arguably a method of institutionalizing
discrimination.
C. Poverty and Exploitation in the Philippines
Bioethical arguments about the right to buy or sell an organ are
based on Western notions of contract and individual choice.34 Yet,
in the United States, organs are construed as gifts for social policy
reasons. The United States does not believe people should have
the choice to sell their organs. "We may freely withhold or freely
give them, but we may not sell them, nor claim them for others as
a matter of right."35 Since demand will continue to escalate, the
only way to close the gap between organ need and availability is to
increase supply. Proponents of a legal market argue that people
respond to monetary incentives. Based on market incentives,
people will sell their kidneys, increase the supply of the scarce and
highly valuable resource, and create a "win-win" situation for the
donor and recipient. The Philippines is one region where the
freedom of contract hypothesis is tested in reality.
In the Philippines, kidneys are legally purchased on an open
market. Medical teams go into the poor areas, perform blood and
tissue tests on the inhabitants, and store the results. When a
recipient arrives for a transplant, an organ broker reviews the
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Scheper-Hughes, supra note 4.
35 James Lindermann Nelson, Do We All Have a Responsibility to Donate Our
Organs? THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 48 (John Balint & Wayne Shelton
eds., 2001).
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stored results, finds a donor based on these results, arranges a
pairing, and a surgeon performs the transplant. The practice is
defended as a matter of free choice. A group of American
physicians and bioethicists concur, arguing that since we cannot
rid the world of poverty, the choice to sell a kidney is the "best
option poverty has left.,
36
Empirical evidence, however, weakens this theoretical
argument. When asked about their health and economic condition,
Filipinos who had sold their kidneys complained of pains and
disabilities for which they could not afford medical treatment.37
They were also further in debt. Before the surgery, many had
worked at loading ships on the docks. After the surgery, they were
no longer able to do heavy lifting or had been fired due to the
stigma associated with infirmity. "Decisions to sell a kidney
appear to have less to do with raising cash toward some current or
future goal than with paying off a high interest debt to local
moneylenders."38 It has even been suggested that once a region is
reputed to be a source for kidneys, "brokers intensify their search
for sellers there; creditors then become more aggressive in calling
in debts, and relatives of patients become still more reluctant to
donate a kidney when they can buy one."39 Some ethicists have
concluded that this freedom of contract is really a "false liberty."40
"The choice to sell a kidney in an urban slum of Calcutta or in a
Brazilian favela, or a Philippine shantytown is often anything but a
free and autonomous one."
4
'
36 J. Radcliff-Richards, The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales, 351 THE LANCET
1950-1952 (1998), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/held/157
VIII.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
37 Rothman & Rothman, supra note 7, at 51.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 David Rothman, Ethical and Social Consequences of Selling a Kidney, 288
JAMA 1641 (2002). "Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has argued, economic
development is too easily subverted by notions of 'false liberty,' the kind implicit in the
so called right to sell a kidney." Id.
41 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs: A Report
Presented to the House Subcomm. on Int'l. Operations and Human Rights, United States
Congress (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.publicanthropology.org/TimesPast/
Scheper-Hughes.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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III. U.S. Law and Policy Towards Organ Harvesting
In stark contrast to the systems in place in Thailand,
Singapore, and the Philippines, the U.S. approach to organ
harvesting is highly restrictive. Despite their differences,
however, all of these systems present problems that may be
equally problematic on an ethical level. In third world countries,
the problem is the presence of systems that lead to unethical
harvesting of organs. In the United Systems, the problem is the
presence of a system that discourages any organ harvesting
whatsoever.
In December 2003, there were 83,686 people on the organ
waiting list in the United States.42 Last year, 6,187 Americans
died while waiting for organs.43 This Comment argues that rather
than creating a situation in which the need for organs is being met,
the system in the United States actually creates critical levels of
organ shortages.
Furthermore, the situation will worsen before it improves. As
medical science continues to advance, the demand for organs will
increase because organ transplantation is the best treatment and
only hope for many people suffering from end-stage disease.
44
"The life saving potential of organ transplantation is limited only
by a shortage of organ donors, 45 which is perpetuated by the
inefficiency of national law and policy in organ transplantation.
A. Federal Law
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA),46 which makes it "unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration 47 for use in human transplantation if the
42 Erika L. Rager, The Donation of Human Organs and the Evolving Capacity for
Transplantation: Exciting Developments and Future Prospects, 65 N.C. MED. J. 18, 18
(2004).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2002).
47 "Valuable consideration" excludes "reasonable payments associated with the
removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and
storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing and lost wages incurred by
2005]
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transfer affects interstate commerce., 48  NOTA established the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. The legislative
history of NOTA is sparse, but the underlying message is clear.
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee stated
plainly, "individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale
of human organs for transplantation."4 9 Likewise, the Task Force
on Organ Transport concluded, "society's moral values militate
against rendering the body as a commodity."5 ° NOTA is limited to
interstate commerce, so the task force encouraged states to create
their own laws.
B. State Law
As the viability of organ transplantation became a reality, the
process for donation was standardized, and the prohibition on sale
was codified. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the UAGA in August 1968 (1968
UAGA).5" By 1973, all fifty states had adopted the Act or some
variation.52 The UAGA proclaims that individuals possess the
right to donate their bodies and body parts after death for the
purposes of transplantation, therapy, research, or education.53 The
1968 UAGA authorizes a living person to make a gift of all or part
of his body after death by means of a will or the execution of a
document signed by the donor in the presence of two witnesses.54
In the absence of a will or other document manifesting the
decedent's intent, the 1968 UAGA grants close relatives the power
to donate their loved one's body after death as long as there is no
the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ." Id. § 274
(e)(c)(2).
48 Id. § 274(e)(b). The Act authorizes criminal fines of as much as $50,000 or
imprisonment up to fives years for any violation. Id.
49 Senate Report accompanying the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act [Taken
from U.S. Cong. Serial Set No. 13557, S. Rep. 98-382 (98th Congress, 2nd Sess)]
available at http://www.pitt.edu/-htk/1984report.htm.
50 See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 (1986).
51 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1 (1968).
52 See id.
53 Id. § 3(1).
54 Id. §§ 4 (a)-(b).
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actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent. 5
In 1987, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws passed an amended version of the UAGA
(1987 UAGA), which was subsequently adopted in whole or in
part by twenty-two states.56 The 1987 UAGA differs from its
predecessor in two important ways. First, the 1968 UAGA failed
to encourage a sufficient supply of organs." One major obstacle
was the proscription that cadaveric organs could not be donated
unless explicit authorization for their removal was obtained. 58 The
1987 UAGA reverses this presumption and allows the removal
without express consent as long as "reasonable efforts" have been
made to notify the appropriate persons and obtain their consent to
donation, and the coroner is not aware of a refusal or contrary
indication by the decedent or his family.59 While placing the
burden on the objecting donor is a step towards increasing supply,
the majority of states have taken no action to reduce the consent
requirement and still adhere to the 1968 UAGA. 60 Second, while
the 1968 UAGA was silent on the issue of organ sales, the 1987
UAGA was amended to prohibit the purchase and sale of organs if
removal of the organ is intended to occur after death.6' Like the
NOTA, the 1987 UAGA also authorizes fines of up to $50,000 or
imprisonment for up to five years for any violation.62
C. Structure of the National Organ Procurement and
Transplantation System
In the United States, a network of organizations work in
tandem to identify potential donors, allocate organs, and perform
the transplantation. NOTA created the National Organ
55 Id. § 2(b).
56 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4 (1987).
57 Erik S. Jaffe, She's Got Bette Davis's Eyes: Assessing the Nonconsensual
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 528, 535 (1990).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 537.
60 Id. at 538.
61 See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2 (1968) & Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2
(1987).
62 42 U.S.C. § 274(e)(a)(2000).
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Procurement and Transplantation System (OPTN) to facilitate
organ matching. 63 The Act called for a unified transplant network
to be operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal
contract.64 The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is the
private, nonprofit organization that contracts with the federal
government to administer the OPTN. 65 A centralized computer
network at the UNOS Organ Center links Organ Procurement
Centers (OPOs) and transplant centers. All patients on the
transplant waiting list are registered with UNOS. The OPTN has
two primary goals: "[t]o increase the effectiveness and efficiency
or organ sharing and equity in the national system of organ
allocation; and, to increase the supply of donated organs available
for transplantation. 66  In order to receive Medicare funds, all
transplant centers and OPOs must be members of OPTN.67
OPOs are private, nonprofit organizations that are members of
the OPTN.68 Each OPO has its own board of directors and
medical director on staff.69  OPOs employ procurement
coordinators, who coordinate each step of the transplantation
process from evaluating potential donors, to obtaining consent
from the donor's family, to placing the organs and traveling with
the procurement team to obtain the organs.7" The OPOs also strive
to promote organ donation within communities.7 They engage in
public and professional education efforts in the hospitals and
communities they serve.72
D. Transplant Process
When a patient needs a new organ, the potential recipient's
63 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, at http://www.optn.org/
optn (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
64 Id.
65 United Network for Organ Sharing, at http://www.unos.org/whoweare (last
visited Jan. 20, 2005).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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name and medical information are entered into a computer
database at the UNOS Organ Center.73 The donor process begins
when a local OPO is contacted by a hospital caring for a patient
with impending brain death.74 Most organs are procured from
donors who have sustained brain death under circumstances that
allow their respiration and circulation to continue to be supported
by artificial means. In 1980, the Uniform Law Commissioners
promulgated the Uniform Determination of Death Act, which
declared that "[a]n individual who has sustained either (1)
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead., 75  Timely determination of
brain death is important to protect the condition of the donor's
organs.
After the declaration of brain death, the donor OPO performs a
medical evaluation and contacts the patient's family to discuss
organ donation. 76  If the family agrees to donation, the
procurement coordinator from the OPO contacts the UNOS Organ
Center to begin the process of organ replacement.7 7 Each time a
donor becomes available, the UNOS computer compares
characteristics of the donor with each individual waiting for that
type of organ.78 The database generates a list of potential organ
recipients, ranked in order based on characteristics such as blood
type, size, medical urgency, waiting time, and location. 79 Factors
such as race, religion, gender, and financial status do not enter into
the equation.8 ° Once the match list is available, the procurement
coordinator contacts the transplant team caring for the patient at
the top of the list.
In general, organs first are offered to patients awaiting
transplant within the OPO in which the organs were donated.8'
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Unif. Determination of Death Act § 1 (1996).
76 See Rager, supra note 42, at 21.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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They are then offered regionally and nationally.82 The accepting
transplant teams travel to the donor's hospital where the
procurement operation takes place.83 UNOS functions as the
middle-man between the donor OPO and the receiving OPO.84
From the time consent of organ donation is obtained, all costs
incurred in the donation process are billed to the OPO8
E. Policy Options
The biggest obstacle for the transplant community is scarcity
of organs. A number of options for increasing supply exist.
Recognizing that the creation of an organ market is one such
option, some members of the legal and medical community are
attacking NOTA's prohibition on the sale or purchase of human
organs. Their approach is to advocate alternatives to the
prohibition, such as providing an ethically acceptable financial
incentive to the beneficiaries of a decedent that may motivate an
individual to formally express his intentions about donation prior
to his or her death.86 The sale of human organs, however, whether
from a living person or a cadaver, is against the law in virtually
every country and has been condemned by all of the world's
medical associations.87 So, while some medical professionals and
ethicists are currently debating the possibility of compensation for
organ donors, a market in body parts is a highly controversial shift
in policy that violates current U.S. law and International Protocols.
Another option for increasing organ supply includes policy
changes involving mandated choice or presumed consent. These
policy changes offer a more viable, unified, and accepted way of
increasing available organs, especially when compared to the
creation of an organ market. Increasing consent rate among
potential donors would significantly increase the number of organs
available. "In fact, if all potential donors became actual donors,
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Charles A. Erin & John Harris, An Ethical Market in Human Organs, 29 J. MED.
ETHICS 137-138 (2003), available at http://jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/
29/3/137.
87 Finkel, supra note 6.
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there would be enough hearts and kidneys available to transplant
each person added to the list in 2002.
"
,88
Within the consent framework, there are two options:
mandated choice and presumed consent. Mandated choice is a
system that requires adults to decide whether they wish to donate
their organs when they die.89 The decision would most logically
be required when obtaining a driver's license. Part of the problem
with deciphering an individual's intent to donate his or her organs
is that most people do not discuss organ donation with family
members because mortality is a difficult and unpleasant topic of
conversation.9" Under a system of mandated choice, each person
is forced to consider the issue and make a decision. 9' The
individual's decision is then honored at the time of death.92
In a Gallup Poll conducted in 1993, only 30% of those
surveyed had signed organ donor cards. 93 When polled to see if
those surveyed would enlist to donate if mandated choice became
the law, 63% said they would enlist.94 The survey implicitly found
that the more one thinks about organ donation, the more likely he
or she is to donate. Of the 25% who said they had previously
given organ donation serious consideration, 76% said that they
would donate their organs. 95 Based on the results of this survey,
mandated choice would increase the number of available organs.
Presumed consent offers an alternative where citizens are
presumed to consent to donation unless they explicitly state they
do not want to be donors. The current donor system in the U.S. is
an "opt-in" system which depends on "a patchwork of organ donor
card, driver's licenses, advanced directives, and durable power of
88 Rager, supra note 42, at 22 (citing Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of
Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349 N. ENGL. J. MED. 667-74 (2003)).
89 Id. at 23.
90 See, e.g., Mandated Choice and Presumed Consent for Cadaveric Organ
Donation, 272 JAMA 809-12 (Sept. 14, 1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/upload/mm/369/ceja-report_055.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Rager, supra note 42, at 23 (citing A. Spita, Mandated choice: A Plan to
Increase Public Commitment to Organ Donation, 273 JAMA 504, 504-506 (1995)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
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attorney for healthcare statements as vehicles for citizens to state
their wishes., 9 6 The opt-in system depends on the referral of all
potentially medically eligible donors to the local OPO.97 The OPO
then initiates contact with the patient's family regarding
donation.98 The OPO tries to determine the "patient's wishes from
documentation and discussions with family."99  Yet, even if the
potential donor indicated his or her wish to donate, the family
must also consent.1°°
In contrast to what normally happens, 82% of Americans
believe that the individual, rather than his or her family should
make the decision regarding organ donation.°' Fifty-eight percent
of Americans were unsure about their own plans to donate.
10 2
Only 38% had discussed their plans with their families. 10 3 Most of
the time, families are making the organ donation decision under
stressful circumstances and do not know whether the decedent
intended to donate. The natural inclination is to use the default
rule. The default rule in the U.S. is not to donate organs. In
contrast, many European countries operate a presumed consent
system.1 4 In Belgium, for example, a national database tracks
those who have opted out, and presumed consent has led to an
increase in the number of available organs.'0 5 In Belgium, less
than 2% of the population opts out of the system. 106
IV. Is Ownership of Our Bodies a Liberty or a Property Right?
The current organ crisis in the United States suggests that
NOTA and UAGA result in market failure. The shortage of
organs for transplantation results in a tragic number of potentially
96 Id. at 22.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Spita, supra note 93, at 504-06).
101 Id.
102 Id. Of those who had thought about the issue, 30% intended to donate and 12%
intended not to donate. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 23.
105 Id.
106 See id.
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preventable deaths. Organs are retrieved from only 15-20% of the
15,000 to 20,000 eligible donors each year and increased efforts to
encourage organ donation would save many more lives.10 7  This
Comment argues that an organ procurement system based on
presumed consent would help to eliminate the gap between organ
supply and demand. The nations with the highest per capita organ
donation rates in the world all operate under presumed consent
laws.0 8 Commentators have warned that the political prospect for
enacting presumed consent laws in the U.S. is bleak.'0 9  In
addition, the public's lack of support for presumed consent is
grounded in legal concepts of privacy and property as they relate
to the human body. This Part discusses individual autonomy and
the freedom from government intervention as it relates to the
human body and questions the underlying premise that we own
107 Mandated Choice and Presumed Consent for Cadaveric Organ Donation,
272(10) JAMA 809-812 (1994.)
108 Austria, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Luxembourg,
Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Greece, and Singapore all have presumed consent.
The opt-out rate is approximately 2%. See Presumed Consent Foundation,
http://www.presumedconsent.org/solutions.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
109 One source notes:
There are some enormous hurdles facing any attempt to promote presumed
consent laws in the US. Unlike nations such as Austria, France, and Belgium,
citizens of the United States tend to be far more distrustful of doctors and of
central governments. While it is true that opinion polls constantly show a
majority saying they want to serve as organ donors, it is also the case that there
are significant numbers of Americans who do not want to do so on religious or
personal grounds. The desire to protect minority views runs very strong in
American culture, and it is highly unlikely that legislators would pursue a policy
that could not guarantee that there would be no errors in utilizing persons as
donors who did not wish to so serve. Add to that the current distrust of
managed care and concerns about what will happen to people who lack health
insurance when they become seriously ill or injured. The reality is that the
political prospect for enacting presumed consent laws in this country is not
good. While there is no ethical reason to prefer an opt-in system such as the
U.S. now uses with its donor cards or an opt-out system of the sort used in
Belgium and Spain with computerized lists of those who don't want to be organ
donors, there is not much reason for political optimism that presumed consent is
going to go far in state legislatures anytime soon.
Arthur L. Caplan & Sheldon Zink, Is Presumed Consent the Answer to Closing the
Organ Availability Gap?, at http://www.ikidney.com/iKidney/InfoCenter/Nephrology
Incite/Archive/PresumedConsent09.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
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our bodies.
A. Competing Rights of Privacy and Property
The future of organ transplantation is uncertain. While
competing scholars arrive at different answers, the question
remains clear, "Do we own our bodies, and do they, if ever, belong
to someone else who needs them?"" Imagine, for instance, a
hypothetical lawsuit where a person needs a new kidney in order
to live. The most suitable donor declines to contribute the kidney.
A lawsuit is brought, and the would-be recipient seeks an
injunction requiring the would-be donor to donate his kidney.
While alive, the donor defends under the Fourteenth Amendment
right to privacy. Privacy law guarantees a zone of freedom under
the Fourteenth Amendment that protects certain liberties so
fundamental and intimate to individual autonomy that government
intrusion is unwarranted."' Framed as a privacy issue,
government invasions of the body are unconstitutional unless
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.1 2  In the
hypothetical presented, the Fourteenth Amendment would almost
certainly protect the donor's right to refuse the invasive medical
operation even if it means the loss of a life that could have been
saved.
How does the foregoing analysis change when the donor is
dead and property law replaces privacy law? Conceptually,
property is a bundle of rights, including the right to "possess, use,
exclude, profit and dispose.""' 3 Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, deprivations of property are
constitutional if rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 114
110 Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law
and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2113 (2003).
111 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
428 (1972).
112 "Where certain fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a compelling state interest and the legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 114 (1973).
113 United States v. Frost, 125 F. 3d 346, 367 (6th Cir. 1997).
114 In cases where government action impairs non-fundamental rights (most
economic and social welfare regulation), the court applies a rational basis test.
Legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
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Furthermore, property can be taken from one person and
reassigned to another upon payment of compensation; privacy
cannot."' U.S. law has evolved so that privacy protects life and
property law applies in death. When the subject is invasion of the
human body, under property theory, the state possesses the power
to extract the decedent's organs for any public purpose, so long as
it provides him or her with just compensation.116
B. Life and Privacy
There is an intuitive and constitutional difference between
extracting an organ from a living human being and taking an organ
from a dead body. Most people are repulsed by the idea of forced
organ removal during life. An intuitive response would be, "Not
my body," which belies a sense of ownership as well as privacy.
This part describes the general legal consensus that an individual
is protected by privacy rights during life. Even during an
individual's life, however, the right to live free from government
intrusion is not absolute, and there are clear exceptions to
individual autonomy. Discussing several ways in which
government interests override individual autonomy, this portion of
the Comment argues that organ extraction during life is
conceivable. This section does not argue that living organ
extraction is preferable. The goal is to acknowledge that such a
system is possible under existing law, especially in light of
abortion law.
1. No Duty Rule
In McFall v. Shrimp, 117 the Pennsylvania court posed the
following question, "In order to save the life of one of its members
by the only means available, may society infringe upon one's
absolute right to his 'bodily security'?," 8 In this case, the plaintiff,
McFall, suffered a rare bone marrow disease and faced certain
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
115 Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 439
(2000).
116 Id. at 440.
117 McCall v. Shrimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Ch. Ct. 1978).
118 Id. at 90-91.
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death without a bone marrow transplant." 9  McFall sought an
injunction to require Shrimp, his cousin, to donate his bone
marrow, a procedure which would have imposed little risk but a
great deal of pain. 2 ° The court refused to grant the injunction,
citing the common law rule, which provides that "one human
being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to
save another human being or to rescue."' 21 Similarly, in Curran v.
Bosze, 122 the court denied a father's request for an injunction to
order a mother to produce her twin children for blood testing and
possible bone marrow harvesting in order to save the life of their
half-brother, who would die without a bone marrow transplant.1
23
How does this analysis change upon death? One could argue
that, morally, it is the duty of every able person to donate his or
her organs upon death. Opponents would assert the classic "no
duty" principle of American tort law, which protects individual
autonomy. Yet, our notions of morality test this "no duty" rule
with hypothetical "stories about children tripping, hitting their
heads, and falling insensate into shallow ponds."' 124 In these cases,
most people conclude that failure to rescue, absent any personal
risk to the hypothetical rescuer, is morally wrong. 25 Some states
even impose criminal penalties in "duty of easy rescue" cases
where assistance can be given without personal risk to the
rescuer. 126  Arguably, organ donation falls within this same
category of "duty of easy rescue." One could argue that there is "a
presumptive duty to provide others with organs that may be vital
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 91.
122 See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I. 1990).
123 Id.
124 Nelson, supra note 35, at 52.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12 § 519(a) (1973):
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided
by others.
Id. (providing for a maximum fine of $100).
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to them but are useless to us."'27
2. Military Conscription and Compulsory Vaccinations
The rights to possess, use, and exclude others from one's body
while one is alive are established by constitutional law. When the
United States abolished slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment, a
person could no longer be the property of another. This right is
not absolute, however, as illustrated by the military draft. In Arver
v. United States,'28 the Supreme Court held that raising an army by
means of a selective draft does not impose involuntary servitude in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. In its ruling, the Court
held "it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just
government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal
obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need,
and the right to compel it." Accordingly, "people can be
conscripted into the military against their will and be made to put
their bodies to the service of the common good."'
129
Similarly, compulsory vaccinations have been upheld as
necessary for the common good. 3 ° These cases illustrate the
exceptions to individual autonomy. In some circumstances,
individuals are compelled by law to sacrifice their bodies for the
public good. This Comment does not intend to argue that living
people should be taken by the state as chattel and required to
donate expendable organs. Rather, the purpose is to illustrate that
there is not, nor has there ever been, an absolute right to bodily
privacy in life, much less in death.
3. Privacy Cases
The Supreme Court developed a right of privacy under the
rubric of substantive due process. According to the current
Court's analysis, individuals have a right to define their own
morality and existence. 3' In order to do so, individuals have a
127 Nelson, supra note 35, at 51.
128 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918).
129 Calabresi, supra note 110, at 2134.
130 See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
131 The Supreme Court recently stated:
In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not
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certain amount of autonomy in decision-making about
fundamental aspects for self-hood. '32 This class of rights extend to
"activities relating to marriage;"' 13  "procreation; contraception;"'' 34
"family relationships; and child rearing and education."' 135  The
privacy right is not absolute, however, in that courts do not speak
of "ownership." Legislation attempting to curtail a privacy right
may be enacted if the state has a compelling interest in supporting
the legislation and the actual statute is necessary to support the
compelling interest. The best example of this analysis is
illustrated by the abortion debate.
For a long time, laws against abortion obliged women to give
their bodies to save fetuses or unborn children. 136 Some states still
indicate that women may be punished if they do not care for their
bodies for the benefit of their unborn child. 137 In Roe v. Wade,
138
the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing
abortion. Many would concede that the Texas statute encroached
on a fundamental right. Roe was a difficult case because of the
strong state interests in protecting the fetus that were balanced on
the government's side. It would have been more difficult if the
court found that the fetus has a competing fundamental right.
There is no indication, however, that the term "person" in the
Constitution was ever meant to include fetuses.1 39 Thus, the Court
found that the Constitution protects a right for a woman to choose
to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. 140  Though Roe
be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558,
562 (2003).
132 Id.
133 Loving v. Va., 386 U.S 986 (1967).
134 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
135 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152-53 (1973).
136 See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992).
137 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
138 Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
139 Id.
140 Viability is the point at which "the fetus ... has the capability of meaningful life
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suggests a right to make choices concerning one's own body, the
Court retreated from this stance in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,141  leading many
commentators to conclude that a constitutional right of ownership
of our bodies is an overstatement.1 42 The Casey Court conceded
that a state can interfere with a woman's individual autonomy and
privacy if there is a compelling state interest and no "undue
burden" on access to abortion.'43
Rather than focusing on abortion as a fundamental liberty, a
different reading of Roe suggests the right of women to be on
equal footing with men. Men can walk away from pregnancy so
that the pregnancy has minimal impact on the man's life, career,
and self-development. This option is not available to women.
Applying this rationale, Roe stands for "a prohibition of
discriminatory taking of women's bodies for the alleged common
good, and not a prohibition of universal, non discriminatory
appropriations for that purpose."" Based on this rationale, a
statute that makes kidneys available to those who need them based
on universal appropriation, even during life, may be valid in the
face of severe public need. Furthermore, when looking at the
government's competing interest, we are now dealing with a
human being, rather than a fetus, whose life depends on the
donation. This would seem to present an even more compelling
interest in supporting legislation to mandate living organ donation.
In consideration of such a law, the McFall court opined:
[f]or a society which respects the rights of one individual, to
sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members
and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to
our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction
of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such
would raise the specter of the swastika and the Inquisition,
reminiscent of the horrors this portends.1
45
Yet, even after Roe, courts have sometimes required pregnant
outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163.
141 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
142 Calabresi, supra note 110, at 2136.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 McCall v. Shrimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92(Ch. Ct. 1978).
20051
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
women to undergo dangerous procedures for the protection of
their fetuses. One court permitted a hospital to perform a
caesarian section over the objections of a terminally ill woman
who was 26 weeks pregnant, when the surgery posed substantial
risks to the woman's health but was necessary for the fetus to
live. 146 In sum, Roe stands at the intersection of two lines of cases.
The first line operates on "liberty" principles, as they relate to
intimate relationships, family, and decisions about whether to bear
a child. The second line of cases puts recognizable limits on
governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its
rejection.'47 The foregoing discussion of Roe and Casey shows
that freedom from government intervention is not an absolute
right. On occasion, state interests trump privacy as illustrated by
abortion law. The same rationale could extend to organ
procurement.
C. Privacy Rights End at Death
Several states have enacted presumed consent statutes that
permit the removal of organs from a dead body without prior
consent. The constitutionality of presumed consent laws has been
questioned on two fronts: (1) as an invasion of privacy and (2) as a
"taking" of property. The privacy challenge fails because privacy
rights end when the individual is brain dead. The "taking"
challenge has met with mixed reviews in the lower courts.
1. Extracting Organs from Corpses is not an Invasion of
Privacy14
8
In Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital,149 the Michigan
Court of Appeals upheld a statute that permitted a dead daughter's
corneas to be harvested without her mother's consent. The court
explained that:
the privacy right encompasses the right to make decisions
concerning the integrity of one's body .... However, this right
is a personal one. It ends with the death of the person to whom
146 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
147 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
148 See infra note 196 and the cases cited therein; Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d
552 (6th Cir. 1999).
149 Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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it has value. It may not be claimed by his estate or his next of
kin.150
Therefore, if there is any shield to guard against organ
extraction, it takes the form of property, not privacy rights in
death. '5
2. Incompetent Pregnant Women
Interestingly, thirty-three states currently prevent the removal
of life-sustaining medical care from an incompetent pregnant
woman even when doing so denies the woman's express wishes
stated in her living will. 52 "The laws literally 'take' the bodies of
incompetent pregnant women, treating them like chattel that may
be drafted into service as fetal incubators for the state."'
153
Pennsylvania acknowledges its "taking" of the incompetent
pregnant woman's body by providing "just compensation" by
paying the expenses associated with continued medical care.' 54
Two cases address the constitutional questions posed by state
laws preventing the removal of life-sustaining medical care from
an incompetent pregnant woman. In University Health Services v.
Piazzi,'55 a Georgia court refused to take a brain dead pregnant
woman off life support until the birth of her fetus.'56 The court
held that Donna Piazzi lacked power to terminate her pregnancy
under state law, regardless of whether she had a will that provided
those instructions."' The court said that any constitutional right to
refuse treatment and to terminate her pregnancy were privacy
rights that were extinguished when she became brain dead.'58
In DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton,59 JoAnn DiNino sued the
state seeking a declaratory judgment to uphold her living will even
150 Id. at 277.
151 Id.
152 Rao, supra note 115, at 409.
153 Id. at 410.
154 Id. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §5414(c)(1) (Supp. 1999).
155 No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Richmond Cty. Super. Ct., Ga., Aug. 4, 1986).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 6.
158 Id. at 7.
159 DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984).
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if she were pregnant.160 She argued that the state law suspending a
living will during the course of pregnancy was unconstitutional.
1
'
6
The Washington Supreme Court held that the case did not present
a justiciable controversy because DiNino was neither terminally ill
nor pregnant. 1
62
Under the privacy/property dichotomy, the brain dead pregnant
woman has "crossed the legal boundary separating life from death,
and thus receives precisely the same treatment under law as a
corpse. '63  If she continues to have control over her body, the
ownership must derive from property rather than privacy. "6 It
follows from this line of cases, that a system could be devised
where organ donation could be compulsory. Under such a system,
upon death, organs would belong to the state and could be
harvested, regardless of the wishes of the decedent or the
decedent's family. If thirty-three states maintain this law when a
fetus is the competing interest, then surely a human life struggling
for survival is more compelling.
D. Property Rights in Corpses
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing]
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the
law."' 65  As Tillman clarified, privacy rights are extinguished at
death. Property interests, however, are usually transferred to the
decedent's next of kin. If the U.S. government takes private
property for public use without providing just compensation to the
citizen from whom the property is taken, the government has
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.166 A claim
under §1983167 for an unconstitutional deprivation of property
160 Id. at 1299.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1300.
163 Rao, supra note 115, at 452.
164 Id.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
166 Id. amend. V.
167 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2002). Section 1983 is the civil action for deprivation of
rights. To state a cognizable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff s complaint must allege that
the conduct of a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. Walker v.
Reed, 104 F.3d 156, 157 (8th Cir. 1997). If a plaintiff establishes a threshold claim under
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must show: (1) a deprivation, (2) of property, (3) under color of
state law. 168  Some legal scholars have argued that the taking of
cadaveric organs without the explicit consent of the deceased
constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property.1
69
Currently, the courts do not recognize property rights in a
corpse.17° The law does recognize, however, a "quasi property
right" of the family to dispose of the decedent's remains in a
manner consistent with its state's laws.' 7' The Supreme Court has
not yet addressed if the rights of possession of one's own body are
property interests protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution. 7 2 Nor has it addressed due process protections are
applicable to the rights of next-of-kin to possess and control the
bodies of their deceased relatives. 7 3  The lower courts are
currently debating whether this property right is constitutionally
protected.
1. Unconstitutional Property Rights in Corpses v.
Constitutional Property Rights
a. Quasi Property Rights in Corpses are not
Constitutionally Protected
Whether relatives of a deceased person have a constitutional
property interest in the decedent's body is uncertain. Thus far,
§ 1983 for an unconstitutional deprivation of property, [the] question becomes whether
the state afforded constitutionally adequate process for the deprivation." Newman v.
Sathyavaglswarn, 287 F.3d 786, 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
168 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1981).
169 See Jaffe, supra note 57.
170 Rao, supra note 115, at 384.
171 Id. One court explained the difference between a property and a quasi property
right in a corpse in the following manner:
Although... the body is not property in the usually recognized sense of the
word.., we may consider it as a sort of quasi property, to which certain
persons may have rights, as they have duties to perform towards it arising out of
our common humanity. But the person having charge of it cannot be considered
as the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds it only as a sacred trust for the
benefit of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in it.
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242-43 (1872).
172 See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
173 Id.
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lower courts have issued inconsistent rulings. In Georgia Lions
Eye Bank Inc. v. Lavant,174 a mother claimed that corneal tissue
had been wrongfully removed from her deceased infant, in
violation of her Constitutional right of due process. 75 The parents
had not objected to the removal of the tissue but neither had they
been asked to consent. 76 At issue was the constitutionality of the
Georgia cornea removal statute, which authorized the removal of
corneal tissue from a decedent, if no objection had been made by
the decedent while alive or by the next-of-kin after the decedent's
death. 177 The lower court held that the statute violated "due
process because it deprives a person of a property right in the
corpse of his next-of-kin and fails to provide notice and an
opportunity to object."' 178
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the lower court's
decision with a strong public policy argument. The court noted
that the statute in question had been passed by a "virtually
unanimous General Assembly," and that "before its passage,
approximately twenty-five corneal transplants were performed
each year," while after its passage "more than 1000 persons
regained their sight through transplants."'179 This court balanced
the statute's public benefit against its infringement on a parent's
rights. "The preservation of the public health is one of the duties
devolving upon the State as a sovereign power. In fact, among all
the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws, none is
more important than the preservation of the public health."''
80
The court explained that any "quasi" property right that a
relative might have in the body of a decedent was one that was
created by the courts at common law and was not a right created
by either the U.S. or Georgia constitutions.' 8' Once the court
found that this right was not a constitutional right, it found no
problem in reversing the lower court and upholding the statute
174 Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
175 Id. at 127.
176 Id. at 128.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 129.
181 Id. at 128.
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since, according to the court, the legislature has authority to
modify or abrogate a common law right of action. 8 2 The statute,
which allowed for the harvest of corneas, in some cases without
the consent of the next-of-kin or even notice to the next-of-kin,
was upheld.
83
In State v. Powell,"8 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Florida's cornea donation statute, which
operated on presumed consent.8 5 The parents of the decedents
claimed that medical examiners violated the state constitution
when they removed the corneas of each decedent without notice or
prior consent. 186 The Court rejected their arguments, stating that
"a person's constitutional rights end at death."'' 87  It then
emphasized that "the next of kin have no property right in the
remains of the decedent," and that the rights of a decedent's next-
of-kin are limited to those of burial and sepulture. 1
88
The Florida Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of its
holding in Powell in Crocker v. Pleasant.89 The Court allowed a
§ 1983 claim to go forward for interference with the right of next-
of-kin to possess the body of their son because "in Florida, there is
a legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession
of the remains of a decedent for burial."' 90  The Court
distinguished Powell based on the "infinitesimally small intrusion"
of the removal of the cornea balanced against the public health
interest in cornea donation,' 9' and held that its rejection of a
constitutional attack "on a narrowly drawn statute regulating the
disposition of the corneas of a deceased person does not translate
into the broader conclusion that the right to possess a loved one's
remains for the purposes of burial should never be accorded
182 Id.
183 Id. at 129.
184 497 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 1986).
185 ld. at 1188.
186 Id. at 1190.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1191.
189 778 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2001).
190 Id. at 988.
191 Id. at 984.
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protected status under the Fourteenth Amendment."192
b. Quasi Property Rights In Corpses are
Constitutionally Protected
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have acknowledged a next-of-kin
property right in the bodies of corpses. In Brotherton v.
Cleveland,'93 a widow and her children sued the county coroner
for violation of equal protection and due process rights when the
coroner removed and donated the decedent's corneas without
consent. 94 The Sixth Circuit found that the coroner's actions
amounted to a deprivation of constitutionally protected property
under §1983. The court held that the aggregate of rights granted
to the wife in the body of her dead husband, which included the
right to possess the body, to control disposal of the body, and to
file suit for disturbance to the body, rose to the level of a property
interest protected by the Constitution.'95  Brotherton was a
controversial holding because, as the dissenting judge stated,
"Ohio law has made it very clear that there is no property right in a
dead person's body." 196 To address this issue, the court explained
that the constitutional property interest turns on the substance of
the interest recognized, not the name given to that interest.
Therefore, rights of the next of kin in Ohio "form a substantial
interest in the dead body, regardless of Ohio's classification of that
interest."' 9 7
The Sixth Circuit affirmed its decision in Whaley v. County of
Tuscola,'98 explaining that states recognize a common law right
that allows the next-of-kin to possess the body for burial and assert
192 Id. at 985.
193 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
194 Id. at 477.
195 Id. at 482.
196 Id. at 483. See Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547 (stating that the possessory
right in a body for the purpose of preparation, mourning, and burial does not constitute a
property right in the body of another); Hayhurst v. Hayhurst, 4 Ohio Law Abs. 375 (C.P.
Hamilton Country 1926) (concluding that there can be no property in a dead body);
Hadsell v. Hadsell, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 725, 726 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 1893) (holding that a dead
body is not property, and it does not belong to surviving relatives in the order of
inheritance as other property of an estate).
197 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
198 Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995).
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a claim against others who disturb the body.' 99 The common law
right, in conjunction with the statutory right to control the
disposition of the body as recognized in each state's adoption of
the UAGA, is sufficient to create a next-of-kin property interest in
the corneas of their deceased relatives that can not be taken
220
without due process of the law. 2°
More recently, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,2° parents of
deceased children brought a § 1983 action against a coroner,
alleging a taking of their property without due process.2 °2 The
coroner obtained possession of the bodies and pursuant to
California Government Code §27491.47,2°3 removed the corneas
from those bodies without the knowledge of the parents and
without an attempt to notify them and request consent. °4 Relying
on the Sixth Circuit's opinions in Whaley and Brotherton, the
Ninth Circuit held that the exclusive right of next-of-kin to possess
bodies of deceased family members created a property interest
entitled to due process protection.2 5  The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that simply because California forbids the trade of
body parts for profit does not mean that the next-of-kin lack a
property interest in them.20 6 The Supreme Court has "never held
that a physical item is not 'property' simply because it lacks a
positive economic or market value.,
207
While the court in Newman held that the state owed the parents
some due process, it remains unclear what constitutes due process
in these circumstances. The court acknowledges the state's
interest by stating:
[w]e do not hold that California lacks significant interests in
199 Id. at 1116.
200 Id. at 1117.
201 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
202 Id. at 786.
203 CALIFORNIA CODE § 27491.47(a) allowed the coroner to "'remove and release or
authorize the removal and release of corneal eye tissue from a body within the coroner's
custody' without any effort to notify and obtain the consent of next of kin 'if... [t]he
coroner has no knowledge of objection to the removal."' Newman, 287 F. 3d at 795.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 795-96.
206 Id. at 797.
207 Id.
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obtaining corneas or other organs of the deceased in order to
contribute to the lives of the living [but]... courts are required
to evaluate carefully the state's interests in deciding what
process must be due the holders of property interests for their
208deprivation.
In Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health,20 9
the Supreme Court decided that states have an "unqualified
interest" in the preservation of human life.2 '0 The Newman court
also acknowledged that "[a]n interest so central to the state's core
police powers as improving the health of its citizens is certainly
one that must be considered seriously in determining what process
the parents were due.",2
11
2. Reconciling Presumed Consent and Property Law
If the court finds a property interest in a deceased relative's
body, the question then becomes how much weight is given to that
interest? The court began to measure the quantitative significance
of the constitutional property interest in a deceased relative's body
in Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank.212 In Mansaw, a father
challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that allowed
his dead son's organs to be harvested, based solely upon the
consent of the boy's mother, without securing his consent. The
court stated that "the only constitutionally protectable interest that
a person may have in a deceased relative's body should be
characterized as a property interest., 213  The court called the
property interest "minimal," however, visualizing it as a "low right
on the constitutional totem pole" when compared to other rights
such as privacy. 214  The father's right was further diminished
because it was a joint interest shared equally with the boy's
mother.215 Therefore, the court held that half of an interest in this
property right did not outweigh the state's interest in providing
208 Id. at 799.
209 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
210 Id. at 262.
211 Newman v. Satnyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d at 799.
212 Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
213 Id. at 8.
214 Id.
215 Id.
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organs to the living. "Plaintiff's interest must yield to the greater
rights of the state-and our society-in carrying out its public
policy, when the co-owner has consented and the hospital is
unaware of [the] plaintiff s objections. 216
While the lower courts disagree as to the existence of
constitutional property rights in corpses, where a property right is
recognized, the requirement of proper due process does not
exclude the possibility of presumed consent laws. After holding
that a constitutionally protected property right existed, the
Brotherton court suggested that the right would not be violated if a
proper pre-deprivation procedure existed.217  The court did not
suggest an appropriate procedure but mentioned the need for the
next-of-kin to be notified and given an opportunity to be heard.2 18
Additionally, the dissent in Georgia Lions suggested the need for
minimum due process requirements of notice to the next-of-kin
and a chance for the next-of-kin to object.219
Where the next-of-kin has a property interest in a deceased
relative's body, presumed consent laws provide the necessary due
process. A presumed consent law can provide appropriate pre-
deprivation procedures so that the government can take the
deceased's organs and lawfully take the property from the next-of-
kin. For example, a Pennsylvania statute220 provides indirect
"compensation" to the next-of-kin, allowing money from the trust
fund to be used for things such as the decedent's hospital and
221 ifuneral expenses. It is interesting to note that Pennsylvania is
also the only state that acknowledges its "taking" of the
incompetent pregnant woman's body by providing "just
compensation" by paying the expenses associated with continued
medical care.222
Since state, federal, and international laws forbid the exchange
216 Id.
217 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F. 2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
218 Id.
219 Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
220 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622.
221 Id. § 8622(b)
222 Id. §5414(c)(1). Pennsylvania is also the first state to implicitly recognize the
parallel between abortion law and organ procurement. See discussion Part IV.C, supra.
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of organs for direct compensation, such indirect measures should
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "just compensation."
Presumed consent laws should also ensure that the public as a
whole receives notice of the eventual taking through public
education measures that would need to be in place. Although
presumed consent might not allow the next-of-kin to be heard or
object to the removal of organs, due process does not require
notice and a hearing in every situation. 23 Several reasons exist for
excusing the hearing and objection requirements in this scenario.
First, allowing the next-of-kin with the opportunity to be heard
and object will defeat the purpose of presumed consent laws.
Second, the Supreme Court has explained that procedural Due
Process guarantees are directed primarily at adjudicative action
and are rarely applicable to rulemaking.224 "Where a rule of
conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. 2 25 Third,
presumed consent laws give the decedent the ultimate choice over
his or her organs and intend to facilitate family discussion on
organ donation while all parties are alive. When the decedent's
organs are removed, family members may argue that the state is
taking their property interest in the deceased's body. If so, there
has been adequate process. The family discussion that took place
during the decedent's life should be construed as a "hearing" and a
chance to "object. '226 The next-of-kin, who will hold the quasi
property interest in the decedent's body, can speak to family
members about organ donation and will have their say during the
decedent's lifetime., 227 When the courts "[c]ouple [the] rather
minimal [property] interest with the exigent circumstances
surrounding and accompanying the organ donation decision and
the State's legitimate and compelling interest in providing for and
securing a future for the living.., it becomes highly doubtful that
[any significant] process is due [to the] plaintiff., 228 Therefore,
223 See Bi-metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 441.
226 Samantha A. Wilcox, Presumed Consent Organ Donation in Pennsylvania: One
Small Step for Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ Donation, 107 DICK. L. REV.
935, 949-50 (2003).
227 Id.
228 Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
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even if a constitutionally protected property right exists, presumed
consent laws survive the constitutional challenge.
V. International Law and Presumed Consent
NOTA and UAGA are insufficient to replenish organ demand
in the U.S. and, therefore, prompt would-be recipients to take
matters into their own hands.2 29 Unfortunately, self-help measures
result in the exploitation of impoverished inhabitants of third
world countries, in the manner described in Part II above. The
only way to solve the crisis is through international collaboration
to increase organ supply. A market in which the impoverished sell
their organs to the rich is not an ethical solution. The WMA and
the European Community have taken steps to denounce the black
market for organs. Accordingly, there is international support for
a movement towards presumed consent.
A. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
In recognition of the human rights abuses occurring in
impoverished countries, many European countries are passing
laws to protect the exploited from selling organs for a pittance. In
1997, the Council of Europe signed a treaty to protect living
donors. The Council agreed that "donor consent was necessary for
any organ procurement law and that financial gain in the organ
market was highly unethical. 23 ° In 2001, the Council of Europe
enacted the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, Concerning Transplantation of Organs
and Tissues of Human Origin (the Protocol).23' Parties to the
Protocol use their own internal laws to effectuate the measures
enunciated by the Convention.232 The Protocol distinguishes
229 See Finkel, supra note 6.
230 Troy R. Jensen, Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and their
Effectiveness, 22 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 555, 557 (2000); see Council of Europe: Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Explanatory Report, Apr. 4, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 817
(1997), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/164.htm.
231 See Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and
Explanatory Report, supra note 230; Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs
and Tissues of Human Origin, E.T.S. N. 186, Jan. 24, 2002, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enTreaties/Word/186.doc.
232 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
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between: (1) living donors capable of giving consent, 33 (2)
incompetent living donors,234 and (3) deceased donors.235
1. Consent from Living Donors
When obtaining consent from a living donor, the emphasis is
placed on informed consent.236 Article 5 of the Protocol requires
that "interventions in the field of organ and tissue transplantation
can only be performed after a person has given free and informed
consent which can be freely withdrawn at any time. 237 In order to
avoid coercion, the Protocol recommends that "the donor be
assured that he or she can withdraw.., consent at any time in
complete confidence., 238  To that end, the donor should be
"interviewed in private and helped to cope with the consequences
of [that] decision. 239 Consent is paramount when the organ donor
is a living human being. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that
both international and U.S. law reject the idea of forcible organ
extraction during life, even when one sibling could save the life of
another by providing the needed kidney.
2. Protecting Incompetent Donors
The law differs when the potential donor is unable to give
consent to the removal of organs. Article 14 of the Protocol deals
with the question of the removal of organs from a living person
who lacks the capacity to give consent.240 "The principle is that
this practice is prohibited. 24' The Convention makes an
allowance for removal of regenerative tissues in exceptional
Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin,
Explanatory Report, para. 35, available at http://www.unav.es/cdb/coeadtrasplanteser.
html (last visisted Jan. 20, 2005).
233 Id. para 73.
234 Id. para. 80.
235 Id. para. 98.
236 Id. para. 73.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. para. 80.
241 Id.
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circumstances where the beneficiary is genetically compatible.242
For instance, the Protocol would allow "the removal of bone
marrow from a minor for the benefit of a brother or sister.,
243
Furthermore, "removal is only authorized on the condition that, in
the absence of donation, the life of the recipient is in danger and
the risk to the donor is minimal.",2' Finally, the authorization of
the representative of the person not able to consent is needed
before the regenerative tissue is removed.245
3. Organ and Tissue Removal from the Deceased
a. Establishing Death
A decedent's death must be established before organs or
tissues may be removed "in accordance with the law. 246 It is the
responsibility of each Member State to legally define the specific
procedure for declaring death.247 In most countries, the law
defines death as "brain death while the essential functions are
artificially maintained., 248 Article 16 provides a safeguard for the
deceased person by insuring that the medical team who certifies
death is not the same one that is involved in the transplant.249
"Failure to keep the two functions separate would jeopardize the
public's trust in the transplantation system and might have an
adverse affect on donation., 25" Recognizing that individuals may
opt out of organ donation if they sense that surgeons have
conflicted interests in keeping patients alive, trust and respect are
essential to a successful system of organ procurement.
b. Presumed Consent
The Convention's primary concern was to increase organ
donation. In order to effectuate this concern, the Protocol outlines
242 Id. para. 81.
243 Id. para. 83.
244 Id. para. 86.
245 Id. para. 87.
246 Id. para. 94.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. para. 96.
250 Id.
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methods for obtaining consent. Article 17 prohibits the removal of
organs unless consent or authorization as required by law is
obtained."' "This requires member States to have a legally
recognized system specifying the conditions under which removal
of organs or tissues is authorized. 25 2 Under the Protocol, the
Member States should, but are not required to, take measures to
inform the public about matters relating to consent or
authorization. 253 The Protocol does not mandate either an "opt in"
or "opt out" system. Instead, it leaves the decision to the
individual Member States.254
The Protocol emphasizes the importance of the potential
donor's decision either to refuse or consent to organ donation. "If
a person has made known their wishes for giving or denying
consent during their lifetime, these wishes should be respected
after his/her death. 255 Objection in an "opt out" system or consent
in an "opt in" system should be registered in an official facility for
recording these wishes.256 If the donor lacked the capacity to
consent during life, organs may be removed if all the
authorizations required by law have been obtained. 7
The Protocol declined to adopt either an "opt in" or "opt out"
system, explaining that, "[w]ithout anticipating the system to be
introduced, the Article accordingly provides that if the deceased
person's wishes are at all in doubt, it must be possible to rely on
national law for guidance as to the appropriate procedure., 25 8 The
Protocol acknowledged the validity of both systems. In some
countries, "the law permits that if there is not explicit or implicit
objection to donation, removal can be carried out. '25 9 In that case,
the law provides a means of expressing intention, such as drawing
up a register of objections.26 ° In other countries, "the law does not
251 Id. para. 98.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. para. 101.
255 Id. para. 99.
256 Id.
257 Id. para. 100.
258 Id. para. 101.
259 Id.
260 Id.
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prejudge the wishes of those concerned and prescribes inquiries
among relatives and friends to establish whether or not the
deceased person was in favour of organ donation. 26' Unless
national law provides otherwise, the Article states that "such
authorization should not depend on the preferences of the close
relatives themselves for or against organ donation., 262 "It is the
expressed views of the potential donor which are paramount in
deciding whether organs or tissue may be retrieved. 263
While not explicitly stating a preference for a system of
presumed consent, the Protocol's preference can be inferred by
Article 19, which advocates the promotion of donation.26
"Because of the shortage of available organs, this article makes a
provision for Parties to take all appropriate measures to promote
the donation of organs and tissues., 265 The Article states, "[i]t is
also appropriate to remember that organ and tissue removal from
deceased persons has to be given priority if living donation is to be
minimized. ' 266 In contrast, the Protocol condemns the sale of
organs by stating that "the human body and its parts shall not, as
such, give rise to financial gain., 267  Any trade in organs for
financial gain is prohibited. The rationale is that, "[o]rgan or
tissue traffickers may also use coercion either in addition to or as
an alternative to offering inducements . .. [and] [s]uch practices
cause particular concern because they exploit vulnerable people
and may undermine people's faith in the transplant system.,
268
Since an organ market is strictly prohibited, donation from
deceased persons is favored, and steps to increase donation are
championed. The Protocol undoubtedly supports a presumed
consent system of organ donation.
261 Id.
262 Id. para. 102.
263 Id.
264 Id. paras. 105-107.
265 Id. para. 105.
266 Id. para. 107.
267 Id. para. 113.
268 Id. para. 119.
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B. European Models of Presumed Consent
1. Presumed Consent in France
Recognizing a growing shortage of kidneys for transplantation,
France passed its presumed consent law in 1976.269 The French
Loi de Cavaillet provides:
An organ to be used for therapeutic or scientific purposes may
be removed from the cadaver of a person who has not during his
lifetime made known his refusal of such procedure. If, however,
the cadaver is that of a minor or a mentally defective person,
organ removal for transplantation must be authorized by his
270legal representative.
The law did not outline the procedure for objecting to organ
donation.27' In 1978, the Council of State, France's highest
advisory and dispute resolving body, issued a decree that specified
the law's procedural requirements.2 2 The decree provided for the
right of the potential donor to object to the donation of his or her
organs "by any means" and at any time.273 Any objection would
be registered in a hospital register maintained for that purpose.274
The decree also allows anyone bearing witness to a patient's
objection to register the patient's refusal in the register.275  Any
physician who is responsible for removing organs from a patient
must check the register to ensure that no objection has been
made. 276 Therefore, reasonable efforts to determine whether any
objections have been made are required, while consent from
family members is not.
269 Law of France No. 76-1181.
270 Emily Denham Morris, The Organ Trail: Express Versus Presumed Consent As
Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical shortage, 90 KY. L. J. 1125, 1135 (2001-2002).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1136; see also William N. Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ Donation:
Lessons From the French Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1013,
1023 (1986).
273 Gerson, supra note 272, at 1023.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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2. Presumed Consent in Austria
Austria's Hospital Law states that "[i]t shall be permissible to
remove organs.., from deceased persons" for the purpose of
transplantation and that "[s]uch removal shall be prohibited if the
physicians are in possession of declaration in which the deceased
person, or prior to his death, his legal representative, has expressly
refused his consent to organ donation., 277  Austria is the only
country with a pure presumed consent system, as it does not offer
the next-of-kin an opportunity to object to donation of the
deceased's organs.2 8 Austrian physicians do not discuss donation
with the family unless the family raises the issue that the deceased
is a minor.279 In order to avoid the organ procurement, the
individual must have objected to donation, and this objection must
be known to the physician at the relevant hour.28' The physician
has no affirmative duty to search for documents indicating consent
or non-consent even if there is doubt regarding the decedent's
wishes.28'
3. Presumed Consent in Spain
Spain is the world leader in organ donation. Organ donations
have increased by 142% since 1989.282 Spain operates under a
presumed consent system.283 While presumed consent is standard,
families are still asked if their loved ones will be organ donors.
284
Another factor that makes the Spanish system unique is "active
277 Federal Law of 1 June 1982 (Serial No. 273), ch. 7, § 62a(1), amended to the
Hospital Law, No. 113, reprinted in Legislative Responses to Organ Transplantation 132
(1994).
278 See W. Land and B. Cohen, Postrmorten and Living Organ Donation in Europe:
Transplant Laws and Activities, 24 Transplantation Proceedings 2165 (1992).
279 Marie-Andrde Jacob, On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post-
Mortem Organ "Donation" in Diversified Societies, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 239
(2003).
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Mary Helen Spooner, More Countries Hope to Copy Spain's Organ-Donation
Success, CMAJ JAMC (2003), available at http://www.cmaj.ca.
283 See Caplan & Zink, supra note 109.
284 Lori Hartwell, Global Organ Donation Policies Around the World, in
CONTEMPORARY DIALYSIS & NEPHROLOGY (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.lorihartwell.com/GlobalOrganDOantionPolicies.pdf.
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detection." '285  Active detection means "having transplant
coordinators visit emergency rooms and the ICU on a daily basis,
checking the roster of patients and their status." '286 Spain created
the Organizacion Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT), a network of
transplant coordinators in 139 intensive care units across the
country.287 ONT professionals identify potential organ donors by
closely monitoring the emergency departments and tactfully
discussing the donation process with families of the deceased.288
A survey by Spanish researchers found that out of 200 families
that declined to have their relatives' organs donated, 78% changed
their mind after the process was explained in detail. 289 The success
of the Spanish system can be attributed to the combination of
presumed consent and its efficient procurement system that
educates the families of potential donors.29 °
C. The Council Of Europe's Response to Organ Trafficking
At the June 2003 Parliamentary Assembly, 291 the Council
addressed the problem of "transplant tourism," which has
prospered hand in hand with the rapid progress in medical science
and technology that has made organ transplantation a routine
medical procedure practiced in hospitals across the world.292 The
Council reiterated:
The supply of organs from cadaveric, but particularly from
living, donors is very limited and strictly controlled in Europe.
There are currently 120,000 patients on chronic dialysis
treatment and nearly 40,000 patients waiting for a kidney
transplant in Western Europe alone. Some 15% to 30% of
patients die on waiting lists, as a result of chronic shortage of
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Spooner, supra note 282.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Rafael Matesanz and Blanca Miranda, A Decade of Continuous Improvement in
Cadaveric Organ Donation: The Spanish Model, 15 J. NEPHROL. 22, 28 (2002),
available at http://www.sin-italy.org/jnonlineNol 15n l/22.htrnl.
291 Trafficking in Organs in Europe, Eur. Consult. Ass'n, 21st Sess., Doc. No. 1611
(2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/taO3IEREC161 .htm
[hereinafter Recommendation 1611].
292 Id.
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organs. The waiting time for transplantation, currently about
three years, will reach almost ten years by the year 2010.293
The Council then noted, "[ijnternational criminal organizations
have identified this lucrative opportunity caused by the "gap"
between organ supply and demand, putting more pressure on
people in extreme poverty to resort to selling their organs. ' 294
Organ trafficking has reached a level of international concern
since "it is very likely that further progress in medical science will
continue to increase the gap between the supply of, and demand
for, organs." The Council noted that poverty was the main
incentive for selling kidneys. 295 "As a result of poverty, young
people in some parts of eastern Europe have sold one of their
kidneys for sums of $2,500 to $3,000, while recipients are said to
pay between $100,000 and $200,000 per transplant. 2 96  The
Council voiced the "grave concern that following illegal
transplants the donor's state of health generally worsens in the
medium term, due to the absence of any kind of medical follow-
up, hard physical work, and an unhealthy lifestyle connected to
inadequate nutrition and a high consumption of alcohol. 297 In a
twist of fate, "[m]ost illegal donors will thus be forced in time to
live on dialysis treatment or await, in turn, a kidney transplant.
298
The situation presents difficult questions: "Should the poor
provide for the health of the rich? Should the price of alleviating
poverty be human heath? Should poverty compromise human
dignity and health? And in terms of medical ethics, should help to
recipients be counterbalanced by neglect of, and harm to,
donors? ' 299 Almost everyone agrees that it is a tragedy for the
poor to sell their bodies for the health of the rich.
The Council of Europe criticized the "recent trends in some
western European countries towards less restrictive laws, which
would allow greater scope of unrelated living donation.""
293 Id. para. 2.
294 Id. para. 3.
295 Id.
296 Id. para. 6.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. para. 7.
300 Id. para. 8.
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Calling for universal action, the Council stated, "[t]rafficking in
organs, like trafficking in human beings or drugs, is demand
driven."' ' Combating this type of crime should not remain the
sole responsibility of countries in Eastern Europe.30 z The Council
listed examples of measures that should be taken by all member
states to minimize the risk of organ trafficking in Europe such as:
reducing demand, promoting organ donation more effectively,
maintaining strict regulation with regard to living unrelated
donors, guaranteeing transparency of national registers and
waiting lists and establishing the legal responsibility of the
medical profession for tracking irregularities and sharing
information.0 3
The Council once again denounced the idea of a market-based
distribution of organs. "The principal according to which the
human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial
gain is part of the legal acquis of the Council of Europe."3o While
those in favor of an organ market cite the inevitable sale of organs
as a call for legalization and regulation, the Council called for
prohibition by strengthening existing laws.30 5  While the
prohibition of organ trafficking is legally established in the
Council of Europe member states, most countries still have
legislative loopholes in this domain.30 6 Criminal responsibility for
organ trafficking is rarely specified in national criminal codes.30 7
"Criminal responsibility should include brokers, intermediaries,
hospital/nursing staff and medical laboratory technicians involved
301 Id. para. 9.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. para. 12.
This principal, already present in Resolution (78) 29 of the Committee of
Ministers and confirmed in particular, by the final declaration of the 3rd
conference of European Health Ministers, which was held in Paris in 1987, was
enacted by Article 21 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(ETC No. 164). The principle was reiterated in its Additional Protocol on the
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (ETS No. 186), opened
for signature in January 2002. Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
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in the illegal transplant procedure."3 8  Medical staff who even
encourage transplant should also be eligible for prosecution.309
Furthermore, "the medical staff involved in follow-up care of
patients who have purchased organs should be accountable if they
fail to alert the health authorities of the situation."31
The Council enacted a four part plan that included actions to
be taken by European member states, "donor countries,"3 1
"demand countries," 312 and relevant bodies of the Council of
Europe.313 Member states are invited to sign and ratify the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine314 and the United
Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.315
Additionally, member states are asked "to recognize their common
responsibility in minimizing the risk of organ trafficking by
strengthening existing mechanisms of co-operation," and to adopt
and apply the recommendations in the WMA Statement on Human
Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation.316
Members of "donor countries" are asked to "improve primary
prevention through awareness-raising and peer education,
particularly in rural areas, in partnership with NGOs, the media,
and relevant international agencies. 31 7  They are also asked to
work with the Council of Europe to enforce criminal codes and
"implement national anti-corruption programs" and "national
poverty reduction strategies.,
31 8
The "demand countries" are asked to "maintain strict laws in
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id. para. 14.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. The World Medical Association's October 2000 declaration on human organ
transplantation contains a set of ethical principles concerning organ transplantation. In
particular, they state: "[p]ayment for organs and tissues for donation and transplantation
should be prohibited." World Medical Association, supra note 8.
317 Recommendation 1611, supra note 291, para. 14.
318 Id.
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regard to transplantation from unrelated living donors, ' 319 "to deny
national medical insurance reimbursements for illegal transplants
abroad,"32 "to deny national insurance payments for follow-up
care of illicit transplants, except where such a refusal would
endanger the life or health of the patients unable to cover the cost
of vital treatment themselves,"32' "to take appropriate measures to
encourage individuals to indicate, by means of statements of
'consent,' their wish to donate their organs after their death, in
order to increase the availability of organs and tissues obtained
post mortem, '3 22 and "to cooperate and provide expertise to
"donor" countries in connection with trafficking in human beings
and organs. 323
The Parliamentary Assembly will instruct the relevant bodies
of the Council of Europe "to develop, in co-operation with
relevant organizations, a European strategy for combating
trafficking in organs," "to advise and assist member states on
organizational measures necessary for putting in place an efficient
transplant system to minimize the risk of organ trafficking," and
"to provide legal assistance in drafting specific amendments to
national criminal codes. 324 Additionally, to address the larger
problem of poverty which causes people to sell their organs, the
Council is instructed to "call on member states to demonstrate
European solidarity towards the countries in eastern Europe which
are most affected by the vicious cycle of poverty and to assist
them, in co-operation with the international financing institutions
and the international donor community, in developing measures to
reduce poverty and create a secure business environment for
investment."3 2
5
VI. Conclusion
As a "demand country," the United States is in a position to
reduce the burden on the impoverished inhabitants of eastern
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
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Europe who sell their body parts for the health of the rich, by
increasing the supply of organs available within the United States.
Primarily, the United States could help relieve the burden by
taking appropriate measures to increase the number of available
organs obtained postmortem by enacting presumed consent
laws.3 26 International collaboration is the only effective way to
stop the flourishing black market.3 27 While some commentators
argue for regulation of an organ market, it is clear that the World
Medical Association, the Council of Europe, the United States,
and a majority of ethicists are repulsed by the idea.
Presumed consent is a viable alternative. Presumed consent is
not only a morally and legally justified course of action, it also
falls in line with the principles enunciated by international
organizations. A major fallacy of the "opt in" system of organ
procurement is the assumption that people who have not registered
to donate their organs have expressed their refusal to donate.
People who fail to sign donor cards would say that organ
donations are desirable and noble when asked.3 28  Arguably,
presuming consent allows us to meet the wishes of most people.
329
Furthermore, the "opt out" registry protects the individual
autonomy of those who do not want to donate their organs. Unless
it can be shown that presumed consent is ethically unacceptable,
society has a duty to pursue the option that would save thousands
of lives.33°
As this Comment has discussed, property and privacy rights
guide the legal analysis of organ donation under U.S. law. While
the individual does not have a right of privacy in death, it appears
that courts are moving towards recognizing the next-of-kin's right
to possess the decedent's body as a constitutionally protected
property right. The recognition of this right, however, does not
preclude presumed consent. It merely requires that the
326 Id.
327 See id. (noting the necessity of "[h]armoni[zing] data and strengthen[ing] co-
operation mechanisms for the allocation of organs in donation procedures").
328 Fady Moustarah, Organ Procurement: Let's Presume Consent, 158 CAN. MED.
Assoc. J. 231-4 (1998), available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/158/2/231.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2005).
329 See id.
330 Id.
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government provide due process. Since the Supreme Court has
said that the states have an "unqualified interest ' '331 in the
preservation of human life, it does not appear that a significant
amount of due process is required. Thus, presumed consent laws
would allow the government to interfere with the property
interests of the next-of-kin and procure organs for the benefit the
public
There are substantial parallels between organ transplantation
and abortion law. When an individual is alive, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects that person from government intrusion
whether in the form of forced pregnancy or organ extraction. This
privacy right terminates, however, when the individual is brain
dead. Thirty-three states have laws that prevent the removal of
life-sustaining medical care from an incompetent pregnant woman
even when doing so denies the woman's express wishes stated in
her living will.332 Anti-abortion law is much more intrusive than
presumed consent because the latter explicitly provides for the
possibility that the individual can easily choose to opt out of organ
donation. Presumed consent is merely the default rule, whereas
the anti-abortion law overrides the expressed wishes of the
individual and her family. Furthermore, when you balance the
competing interests at stake, organ donation saves the lives of
living human beings, whereas the anti-abortion law protects the
potential life of the fetus. A comparison of the two laws leads to
the irrational conclusion that Americans value the potential of life
more than life itself. With over 79,000 U.S. patients waiting for
an organ transplant and 3,000 new patients being added to the
waiting list each month,333 there is no time like the present to
consider a more rational result.
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331 Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262
(1990).
332 Rao, supra note 115, at 409.
333 25 Facts About Organ Donation and Transplantation, Cong. Kidney Caucus,
available at http://www.house.gov/mcdermott/kddneycaucus/25facts.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2005).
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